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Introduction 
Discourse in refugee studies through- 
out the 1980s and 1990s has increasely 
focused on "development" as a cat- 
egory inseparable from the refugee 
phenomenon itself. In earlier studies 
devoted to determining root causes of 
refugee flows, the idea that there was a 
causal link between underdevelop- 
ment and the generation of refugees 
gained currency. Subsequently, litera- 
ture on durable solutions to the refu- 
gee problem (resettlement in host 
countries and voluntary repatriation) 
placed "development" at the centre of 
either solution. Before long, academ- 
ics, politicians and relief agencies 
joined hands in an advocacy campaign 
to make development assistance an 
integral part of of refugee/returnee 
aid. The targeted recipients of the 
"development" gains were the refu- 
gees themselves, the host countries 
bearing the refugee burden, and the 
local host communities-particularly 
the poorest and most vulnerable 
members of those communities. The 
campaign that ensued enriched the 
language of refugee studies by addi- 
tional entries like "Refugee Aid and 
Development" (RAD). The same acro- 
nym could also stand for "Returnee 
Aid and Development," an idea which 
informs some of the work being done 
on repatriation of refugees. 
This paper revisits the discourse as 
it has unfolded over the last several 
years in order to find out whether there 
exists a fundamental relationship 
between development and the various 
concerns of refugee studies, such as 
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refugee movements, resettlement and 
repatriation. A review of much of the 
literature, however, does not reveal 
such a relationship in any fundamen- 
tal sense. "Development" appears to 
be as one of those cherished words like 
"democracy," that every discipline 
tries to identify with, both because of 
the unquestionable relevance that "de- 
velopment" has to all fields of study 
and the desirability of the word's un- 
deniably legitimating signature. In- 
stead matters like refugee generation, 
the rate of success in resettlement and 
repatriation, and, indeed, develop- 
ment itself, are correlates of the type of 
state in whose jurisdiction they take 
place. 
Inmost of the states whichhave gen- 
erated refugees, at least in Africa, the 
social contract, which is supposed to 
be the constitutive element of a state, 
does not seem to have been consum- 
mated. As a result, those who found 
themselves at the helm of the "ship of 
state" have exercised the normal right 
of state to the monopoly of the use of 
violence, without feeling any obliga- 
tion to protect the citizens. In the area 
of development, those states have ar- 
rogated for themselves the role of main 
providers of development, without ei- 
ther the will or the capacity to fulfil that 
function competently. What little de- 
velopment they have been able to 
realize has benefited the rulers them- 
selves and a tiny clique around them. 
Using tight controls legitimized by re- 
pressive domestic laws, they have of- 
ten thwarted citizens' own initiatives 
to pursue their own development 
strategies. These and other contradic- 
tions have degenerated into conflict, 
refugee movements and chronic un- 
derdevelopment. It would seem that 
the pathological nature of the state 
needs to be addressed first before one 
contemplates what development 
would or would not do in the areas of 
refugee generation, resettlement and 
repatriation. 
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Pdcis 
Durant les de'cennies 80-90, les 
discours sur les rtifugie's ont tte'focalists 
sur les liens entre le de'veloppement et 
les mouvements des re'fugie's. En 
d'autres temzes, on a associe' le sous- 
de'veloppement b la cause d u  flux de 
rt5fugie's. Par conse'quent, les solutions 
durables It ce ph&nom&ne devraient 
placer le dheloppement au centre de 
ce t teproblht ique.  Dans cette optique, 
les politiciens et les chercheurs se sont 
mis d'accord pour faire de l'assistance 
au de'veloppement leur cheval de 
bataille. Paradoxalement, l'aide au 
de'veloppement pre'coce a servi leurs 
concepteurs plut6t que les reifugie's et 
encore moins la population locale, et en 
particulier celle qui est la plus d b u n i e .  
A partir de la litttrature existante, cette 
e'tude tente de d'expliquer qu'il n'existe 
pas de relation de cause b effet entre le 
dheloppement et les mouvements des 
re'fugie's au sens fondamental du terme. 
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The Link between Economic 
Development and Refugee 
Movements 
It can be argued that no scientifically 
driven study to date has established 
any correlation between economic un- 
derdevelopment and refugee out- 
flows. Such association, to the extent 
that it has been articulated, has been 
the product of intellectual intuition at 
best, or North-South dialogue rhetoric 
at worst. Academics and bureaucrats- 
cum-politicians are among those who 
have expressed the existence of a link 
between economic underdevelopment 
and refugee generation. Of the two 
categories, the latter has been more 
unequivocal about the assertion that a 
positive correlation exists. The aca- 
demics, on the other hand, have been 
noncommittal on the subject, at one 
moment suggesting that such a rela- 
tionship exists, only to be negated 
1ater.The categorical expression of an 
existing relationship by bureaucrats/ 
politicians can be exemplified by the 
conclusions of two reports prepared 
under the auspices of the UNHCR in 
the mid-1980s, both of which identi- 
- -- - 
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fied "economic underdevelopment as 
a fundamental cause of contemporary 
refugee flows" (Zolberg 1989, 258). 
Another report prepared by a group of 
experts appointed by the UN General 
Assembly, also in the mid-1980~~ 
. . . the group cites underdevelop- 
ment "inherited from colonialism" 
and aggravated by the world eco- 
nomic situati0n.a~ a major root cause. 
As a result, the economics of the 
South suffer balance-of-payments 
problems, deteriorating terms of 
trade, indebtedness, and inflation. 
Environmental related problems of 
desertification and deforestation ag- 
gravate the situation. The result is 
generalized conditions of insecurity 
that threaten the basic conditions of 
survival, compelling large numbers 
of persons to flee. (ibid., 259) 
The general thrust of these views is 
that the political strife and instability 
that often cause refugee outflows are 
only a manifestation of problems of 
economic underdevelopment. The 
state is seldom mentioned as the cul- 
prit responsible for generation of refu- 
gees, except for the unfailing mention 
of "oppressive, segregationist and ra- 
cially supremacist regimes," referring 
to former apartheid South Africa. 
From a bureaucratic-political point 
of view, particularly at the height of 
the North-South dialogue, associating 
every social or political problem of the 
South with underdevelopment was ex- 
pedient in many ways. It is not surpris- 
ing therefore, that the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees pre- 
scribed the following as a solution to 
refugee outflows: 
... unless you really address the 
problem of development, you are 
never going to be able to circum- 
scribe movements of people, 
whether they are refugees for eco- 
nomic, political, or ecological rea- 
sons-and basically the root causes 
combine . . . If we sent proper techni- 
cal assistance, if there was transfer of 
appropriate technology, if one fo- 
cused on the rural areas rather the 
cities, if the quality of life and life 
support systems were improved, 
youwould beginto address theprob- 
lem as it should be addressed. (ibid., 
259) 
The above reasoning can be easily 
challenged by enumerating several 
non-refugee generating countries 
which are much more economically 
underdeveloped than those which 
have generated refugees. Countries 
like Tanzania, Zambia, Swaziland, etc., 
which are not on the list of refugee- 
generating countries, are less economi- 
cally developed than South Africa, 
Angola and Zimbabwe, which have in 
the past been major sources of refu- 
gees. 
As mentioned earlier, academics 
have been rather ambivalent on the 
relationship between development 
and generation of refugees. They have 
sometimes commented on the correla- 
tion in the affirmative. Gorman (1993, 
1) has, for instance, commented that 
economic underdevelopment and 
refugee movements "are in a very real 
sense linked . . . and neither can be fully 
resolved without taking into account 
the other." He further observes that 
"some of the most economically at risk 
nations were also those most responsi- 
ble for generating refugee flows . . ." 
(ibid., 160). However, clearly realizing 
the theoretical and methodological 
questions raised by the above state- 
ments, he neutralizes them by making 
a more cautious, noncommittal con- 
clusion: 
. . . the argument was made that the 
refugee flows in much of the world 
are closely related to development 
issues and often precipitated by civil 
war. Civil war and refugees are 
clearly not confined to underdevel- 
oped or developing nations, as the 
ongoing drama in the Balkans clearly 
attests. but the vast maioritv of refu- 
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gee problems do exist in the develop- 
ing world . . . (ibid., 160) 
The same problem of uncertainty 
about the causal link between under- 
development and refugee generation 
is found in Adelman's writings. On the 
affirmative side, he views the refugee 
problem and economic underdevelop- 
ment as being inseparable: 
. . . the refugee problem is insepara- 
ble from the problem of economic 
development in Africa, both in pre- 
venting situations that create refugee 
flows and in dealing with either of. 
the permanent solutions available 
settlement and repatriation. Unless 
economic development occurs, nei- 
ther solution is workable in the long 
run. (Adelman 1994, ix) 
Reasoning in the opposite direction, 
Adelman has previously argued that 
economics [development] has no posi- 
tive influence on preventing refugee 
generation or in facilitating the con- 
ventional solutions to the refugee 
problem: 
. . . . the belief that capital accumula- 
tion, or industrialization-that is, 
economics-is the cure both to pre- 
vent refugee production and to assist 
in one form of permanent solution 
(economic integration into the local 
economy) seems misplaced. A 
healthy economy is not the basis for 
a stable political system: a healthy 
political system is the primary basis 
for a healthy economy . . . The conclu- 
sion seems-~trai~htfbrward enough. 
There will be no cure to the root 
causes of refugees by directly attack- 
ing the fundamental economic prob- 
lems of the third world. Quite the 
reverse seems to be indicated. The 
development of a good political and 
legal system will be critical to the 
prevention of the production of refu- 
gees and facilitate the repatriation, 
settlement and resettlement of the 
refugees-refugees who seem to en- 
hance economic growth. (Adelman 
1990,19-21) 
Zolberg (1989, 260), for his part, 
while not totally discounting some 
possible relationship between under- 
development and the refugee ques- 
tion, maintains that, "economic 
underdevelopment is by itself not a 
major cause of refugee flows." 
The simple notion. that poverty pro- 
duces refugees is inconsistent with 
the fact that situations of extreme 
economic deprivation usually have 
not generated population outflows 
claiming refugee status. (e.g., the 
poor in India or Burkina Faso) (ibid., 
260) 
Zolberg also raises the issue of the 
difficulty involved in weighting the 
importance of underdevelopment in 
the production of refugees among 
several other colluding causes. Assess- 
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ment of the role of economic under- 
development as a cause of refugees is 
difficult, because it is not easy to 
establish the extent to which "the char- 
acteristic imbalances of economic m- 
derdevelopment contributed to 
violent political conflicts of the kind 
that historically has caused large refu- 
gee flows" (ibid., 261). Regarding the 
supposedly beneficial effect of devel- 
opment upon solutions to the refugee 
problem, such as resettlement and re- 
patriation, he cautions that "when 
massive internal poverty is related to 
the structure of political power and 
production, reforms without funda- 
mental change in the political economy 
will have marginal results" (ibid.) 
Zolberg's thinking seems to be follow- 
ing a polity primacy trajectory. By 
"polity primacy" it is understood that 
an analytical perspective that assigns a 
pivotal causal rolebehind various phe- 
nomena to state and politics. 
On the basis of the foregoing, it 
would seem that the causal link be- 
tween development /underdevelop- 
ment and generation of refugees 
remains a mere hypothesis that has yet 
to be proved. The hypothesis may be 
appealing to common sense, but this 
alone, short of a major scientific study 
corroborating the hypothesis, does not 
confer a paradigmatic status to the as- 
sumed causal link for teaching or even 
policy purposes. 
The "State" as the Hub of Refugee- 
Related Problems: A Polity 
Primacy View 
The word "state" is written in quota- 
tion marks to indicate that there is 
doubt that most refugee-generating 
countries, particularly in Africa, 
qualify to be called as states, at least in 
the modem liberal sense. The state in 
most refugee-producing African coun- 
tries deviates in many ways from the 
type of sociopolitical organization de- 
scribed in the social contract theories 
of the state. According to the latter 
theories, the state comes into being 
when individuals 
leave the state of nature to better 
themselves through a state system . . . 
Individuals trade their right to pro- 
tect themselves and their goods and 
surrender the right to self-protection 
to the state in return for the obliga- 
tion and responsibility of the state to 
provide that protection (Adelman 
1990,22) 
"The elemental justification for the 
modem state, at least since Hobbes, is 
its ability to provide reasonable secu- 
rity for its citizens" (Zolberg 1989,264). 
The state's monopoly of the legitimate 
use of violence, sterns from the social 
contract itself. 
In many of the legal formations 
called "states" in Africa, no process of 
social contract seems to have ever 
taken place. Under colonialism, whole 
population groups found themselves 
herded within the confines of arbitrar- 
ily demarcated territories without con- 
sent. The administration that ruled in 
these territories was the extended arm 
of the metropolitan state and the par- 
ties to the social contract were not the 
indigenous populations but the citi- 
zens of the colonial power. At inde- 
pendence, the neo-colonial states were 
not created out of any discernible so- 
cial contract among the indigenous 
populations, nor were there, in many 
cases, any mechanisms to at least belat- 
edly forge that social contract. The de- 
marcation of the state's territory 
remained sacrosanctly colonial; an in- 
digenous administration emerged 
and the new legal-political formation 
quickly seized monopoly over the use 
of violence and taxation. It also pro- 
claimed itself the provider of develop- 
ment. 
The self-assigned role of provider of 
development was designed to serve 
two twin purposes: to confer legiti- 
macy to the "state" in the absence of a 
social contract and to clip the wings of 
other social institutions that had the 
potential to spread empowerment 
among the people, thus weakening 
"state" control over its extractive ca- 
pacity. This was necessary because the 
political elites who inherited the colo- 
nial state were primarily motivated by 
access to material rewards through 
control of the economic means of pro- 
duction. Political power became for 
these elites the vital resource for self- 
rehabilitation in economic status, and 
membership in the "state" power hier- 
archy was both coveted and jealously 
guarded. Those who managed to 
maintain membership in this hierar- 
chy literally constituted the "state." 
The dynamics of this false start in 
state formation, not born out of a social 
contract, have been described by 
Zolberg (1989,43): 
The ruling elite's project has been 
aptly characterized as "self-aggran- 
dizement combined with enough re- 
distribution to maintain its tenuous 
and vital hold on the state." The 
takeover of the colonial state appara- 
tus enabled the organization of 
clientalist networks through which 
the state was managed. However, in 
answer to the demands occasioned 
by broader mobilization and rising 
expectations around the time of in- 
dependence, these resources had to 
be-expanded and these demands 
met. But because the takeover of the 
colonial state meant controlling 
police and military forces, African 
rulers were able to use coercion to 
refute these demands and limit costs. 
They also quickly discovered the full 
range of authoritarian techniques, 
from the imposition of legal restric- 
tions on political activity in the name 
of national security, to the physical 
elimination of opponents and the re- 
placement of autonomous associa- 
tions with the state-controlled 
bodies. 
Not only does the above eloquent 
description demonstrate the total ab- 
sence of a social contract at the consti- 
tutive phase of the "state," but it also 
shows elimination of any chances to 
institute any such contract during the 
subsequent process of systematically 
tearing apart the social fabric among 
the citizenry. Zolberg (ibid., 40) further 
observes that "although the state 
dominates the social scene, it is itself 
an extremely weak and fragile organi- 
zation, with a limited capacity for 
managing society and directing 
changen-including development. 
What followed was an understand- 
able erosion of the authority of the 
"state," including its jealously 
guarded monopoly of the use of vio- 
lence. In the latter regard, dissenting 
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citizens took up arms which they 
turned against the ruling elites and 
their supporters, but also sometimes 
against an innocent and defenceless 
civilian population (RENAMO in Mo- 
zambique). A variant of loss of mo- 
nopoly over the use of violence 
occurred when the regime in power 
felt under siege and voluntarily gave a 
share of the use of violence to its civil- 
ian supporters by arming them (An- 
gola in the aftermath of the ill-fated 
1992 elections, Rwanda on the eve of 
the 1994 genocide). 
Erosion of state authority was exac- 
erbated by failure in the state's self- 
imposed development mission 
occasioned by both internal and exter- 
nal factors. Internal factors include 
poor economic planning, manage- 
ment, misappropriation of capital 
funds, the ousting of important do- 
mestic economic actors, and in some 
cases, a poor resource base. External 
factors include deterioration of inter- 
national terms of trade, the energy cri- 
sis, the mounting burden of debt, and 
the growing reluctance of investors to 
face the risks of continued instability 
when other choices are available (ibid., 
44). Under such circumstances, sur- 
vival dictates that a significant seg- 
ment of local economic actors exit from 
the directionless framework of state 
macro-economic planning into the un- 
derworld of the "parallel economy." 
This act hits hard on the remaining 
blood vessel of the "state" with respect 
to authority: the exercise of its mo- 
nopoly of taxation. 
Stripped of presumed authority and 
legitimacy, the "state" ceases to be the 
reliable guarantor of the ruling elites' 
social and economic privileges. Not 
prepared to give up, the "rulers degen- 
erate into outright tyrants" (ibid., 44). 
Since refugee testimonies in the ar- 
chives of the UNHCR, and countless 
immigration administrations show 
that in numerous cases refugee flight 
was caused by state tyranny at home, it 
should be possible to carry out an em- 
pirical scientific study that would 
demonstrate the existence of a positive 
correlation between state tyranny and 
refugee outflows. It may also be possi- 
ble to demonstrate, at another level of 
such a study, that there is a correlation 
between refugee generation and the 
level of development of the state. 
In the absence of such a study so far, 
the polity primacy approach which 
associates the refugee question prima- 
rily with state and politics is also still 
more hypothetical than categorical. 
However, it seems to have more ex- 
planatory value than the hypothesis 
that associates the refugee question 
primarily with development, even 
though both hypotheses can be equally 
criticized on epistemological grounds 
that "you cannot get prescriptive 
edicts from a descriptive thesis" 
(Adelman 1990,22). 
Given those epistemological con- 
straints, it nonetheless seems that of 
the two hypotheses above, the polity 
primacy one is more productive in 
terms of causal logic. Causal link be- 
tween state behaviour and refugee 
generation is closer to empirical reality 
than that between development and 
refugee generation. This difference 
arises because the two variables being 
correlated with refugee generation are 
different in a fundamental sense. On 
the one hand, "development" is an 
abstract category which still eludes 
definitional consensus among experts. 
On the other hand, the "state" is not as 
abstract, even though there are differ- 
ing views about whose interests it 
serves. It is almost an animate corpo- 
rate personality which makes things 
happen or not happen - including de- 
velopment. As variables being corre- 
lated with a single constant variable, 
i.e. the refugee question, the two stand 
in a distinct hierarchical order. The 
"state" is an actor; "development" is a 
result. The "state" is active, "develop- 
ment" is passive. In their influence on 
the refugee question, the "active" and 
the "passive" must produce differen- 
tial impacts corresponding to the hier- 
archical order of the hypothesized 
causal agents. It is this logic that sug- 
gests that the polity primacy approach 
is more appropriate for the study of the 
refugee question: its root causes as well 
as its programmatic solutions. 
The relative salience of state and 
politics over that of development in the 
entire refugee question has been 
clearly underscored in the literature 
reviewed. For example, Adelman is of 
the view that development must 
"serve other political ends" such as fair 
distribution of the results of economic 
growth: 
When relative inequalities grow 
rather than decline, when one ethnic 
group is penalized to benefit another, 
we sew the seeds for social dissen- 
sion and reversing economic growth. 
We sow the seeds for the production 
of refugees. (ibid., 19-20). 
Zolberg (1989, 263) also associates 
refugee outflows primarily with poli- 
tics: 
As long as refugees in our world are 
defined with respect to violence in 
the political sphere, the most proxi- 
mate causes of such population 
movements will, in fact, be political. 
From a polity primacy view of the 
refugee question, the diagnosis of the 
problem points to the pathological fea- 
tures of the state and its government. It 
follows therefore that the solutions lie 
in the rehabilitation of the legitimacy 
of the state through a new social cov- 
enant. Adelman (1994, xiii) makes this 
very point: 
Governments that are legitimate and 
that rule by consent rather than by 
force are a prerequisite to ending 
refugee flows and allowing repatria- 
tion . . . To facilitate regime change 
and peace, a number of factors must 
be present: agreements to secure the 
interests of local populations, em- 
powerment and self-determination 
and, the conviction by the warring 
parties that the benefits of peace out- 
weigh the gains achievable through 
struggle. 
The enterprise of rehabilitating stste 
legitimacy through a new social cov- 
enant entails building or rebuilding 
civil society and creating "an adminis- 
trative system which is genuinely rep- 
resentative of local interests and from 
which no section of the population 
feels excluded" (UNRISD 1993, 12). 
This simultaneously requires instilling 
accountability and responsiveness in 
state institutions. 
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Reffigee and Development and 
Polity Primacy 
The last two decades have been char- 
acterized by a heavy "development" 
agenda in refugee studies. This is not 
surprising as the same thing was hap- 
pening to other fields of study 
throughout the global environment. 
The prime movers of this trend were 
the politicians in their innumerable 
fora: the UN General Assembly, the 
Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of 
77, UNCTAD, and the South-South 
Commission, to mention a few. In the 
excitement that built up, a wide range 
of activities were christened "develop- 
ment." There was one United Nations 
development decade; human rights ac- 
tivists unveiled "the right to develop- 
ment;" feminists coined the term 
"women and development," etc. Our 
own field could not afford missing this 
bandwagon, so "Refugee Aid and De- 
velopment" (RAD) hit the confer- 
ence halls and publishing houses. 
Indeed, there were good reasons to do 
that. The first was a legitimate concern 
about the negative impact refugee 
flows may have on host countries and 
local communities. The second, that is 
not as mundane as it may sound, was 
the imperative to maintain research 
fundability in an environment where 
most traditional donors insisted that a 
fundable research project must have a 
development dimension attached to its 
mainstream disciplinary focus. The 
mid-1970s gave literature on the devel- 
opmental implications of massive 
refugee flows into developing coun- 
tries, particularly in Africa. Research 
began in earnest in response to the per- 
ceived problem that poor host coun- 
tries were paying dearly for receiving 
refugees. Gorman (1993) has summa- 
rized that perception: 
There was increasingly a realization 
that large numbers of refugees, often 
spontaneously settled in poor coun- 
tries, could quickly outpace the host 
country's economic and social infra- 
structures. Health facilities and 
schools in the affected regions were 
often overburdened by additional 
stress of refugee needs. In some 
cases, such as Pakistan, the very relief 
operation itself caused a deteriora- 
tion in roads, which were subjected 
to continuous relief convoys of heavy 
trucks laden with relief supplies. In 
arid regions, such as Sudan and 
Somalia, the massive concentration 
of refugee populations led to wide- 
spread deforestation and deserti- 
fication. Stresses on fuel wood and 
water supplies in such areas were 
often acute. Host governments 
found themselves seconding scarce 
expertise and personnel to cope with 
relief logistics, security, range 
management, and the like, in refu- 
gee-affected regions. Under these 
conditions, the development needs 
of the host country, the host region of 
the country, and the local population 
in the affected regions were in dan- 
ger of being ignored. 
The scenario captured in the above 
quotation was so powerful and com- 
pelling that it tended to be accepted at 
face value as self-evident. In quarters 
requiring a rigorous scientific substan- 
tiation of such an assertion, it took the 
expert statements of the late Tristrarn 
Betts and Robert Chambers to stamp 
credibility on the scenario. Tristram 
Betts was an experienced rural devel- 
opment practitioner with many years 
of field work in Africa. Robert Cham- 
bers is a distinguished settlements ex- 
pert. The solution suggested by these 
two authoritative individuals with re- 
gard to reducing the burden on host 
countries was RAD, which according 
to Callamard (1993,1374) responds to 
two intertwined goals: 
to ensure that-the financial burden 
of providing asylum to refugees 
will be shared by the international 
community, and 
that additional resources will be 
granted for development projects 
that will benefit both the refugee 
and local populations . . . It should 
ensure that refugee assistance does 
not further impoverish the poorest 
inhabitants of the host areas, but 
rather contributes to a local devel- 
opment process benefiting them as 
well as the refugees. 
Chambers' field research findings on 
the impact of refugees on the poor in 
host communities, (published under 
well chosen titles such as "What the 
eye does not see" and "Hidden Los- 
ers") excited researchers and practi- 
tioners alike. Betts' strong faith in 
integrated rural development im- 
pacted on action-oriented bureaucra- 
cies with the importance of a 
pathfinder on the operational side of 
RAD. The two combined to launch 
RAD research and RAD advocacy. 
Soon to witness, everywhere, recasting 
of institutional mandates: the 
UNHCR, the UNDP, NGOs, and the 
like strove to accommodate the great 
idea. At various research institutions, 
refugee research adjusted its priorities 
accordingly. 
The initial euphoria notwithstand- 
ing, RAD research and practice has 
remained by and large underdevel- 
oped.In the sphere of research, it was 
soon realized that it was not easy to 
establish a positive correlation be- 
tween hosting refugees and experienc- 
ing a net loss in development. 
Chambers himself (1993, 37-38) ad- 
mits this: 
The effects of refugee influxes on eco- 
nomic development vary a great 
deal. At one extreme, they can make 
things worse, as they appear to have 
done in Bas Zaire in 1978, straining 
food supplies and services, and exac- 
erbating the effects of drought . . . On 
the other hand, food aid and cheap 
labor, together with refugee trading, 
and artisan and farming activities 
can entail and stimulate economic 
development . . . Whether refugees 
depress or stimulate economic devel- 
opment depends heavily on official 
policies and interventions. , 
In examining Chambers' "Working 
hypotheses about which rural hosts 
gain and which lose" (ibid., 39), what 
emerges clearly is that some local peo- 
ple gain while others lose. Since the 
studies do not balance the gains 
against the losses, it is not possible to 
interpret the net effect of refugee pres- 
ence on the host communities. The net 
index of such impact could be as posi- 
tive as it could be negative. 
Another problem that marks Charn- 
bers' field studies is the unconvincing 
assertion that the worsening economic 
conditions of the poorest among the 
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hosts is caused by the presence of refu- 
gees. Even if a "prima facie" case of 
such deteriorating conditions among 
the poorest of the hosts was accepted, 
one would still need proof that no 
other factors were responsible for that 
deterioration. This is important, par- 
ticularly since 1973, for a whole host of 
macro-economic factors have contrib- 
uted to the increasing misery index 
among the rural poor: increasing infla- 
tion, structural adjustment programs, 
a fall in international commodity 
prices, removal of government subsi- 
dies and price controls, etc. Chambers 
does not factor such macro and micro- 
economic variables into his observed 
deterioration of the living conditions 
of the poorest, and this is an omission 
that weakens his research, and there is 
no awareness of any RAD research 
work that has gone beyond these 
weaknesses in order to support the 
practical side of the RAD philosophy. 
Thus, from a purely academic point of 
view, it would seem that RAD rhetoric 
has had a life of its own, independent 
of any solid scientific justification. 
In actual practice, RAD has pro- 
ceeded along a normative trajectory in 
the sphere of politics and advocacy. 
This is where our notion of polity pri- 
macy becomes functional. First of all, 
regardless of whether or not the theo- 
retical foundations of RAD are correct, 
its operational fate lies with the states 
- both aid donors and recipients. One 
of the normative demands of RAD is 
that development assistance takes into 
account the effects of large numbers of 
refugees on the economic and social 
life of the host country. Some of its 
principles are that: 
The UNHCR and the international 
community as a whole should orient 
assistance in a fashion that longer-term 
implications are anticipated [and that] 
. . . Mastructural and refugee-related 
development projects should be addi- 
tional to [aid] provided for a country's 
regular development programming 
(Gorman 1993,65). 
The term "long-term," that distin- 
guishes RAD from ordinary relief aid, 
is at the centre of the RAD controversy. 
It raises the question whether provid- 
ing "additional" long-term develop- 
ment assistance is a reaction which is 
always proportionate to the loss in- 
curred by the refugee host state, and 
whether such a loss could not simply 
be defrayed by ah appropriate short- 
term relief package. In addition, RAD 
thinking also assumes, often incor- 
rectly, that the beneficiary host state 
would unconditionally be willing to 
accept development assistance, re- 
gardless of the administrative modali- 
ties of such assistance. 
For the purpose of discussing the 
proportionate response issue, we will 
use the experience of Tanzania in the 
wake of the recent influx of close to 
500,000 Rwandan refugees at the time 
of the 1994 genocide. Mhina (October 
1994) has reported the following nega- 
tive effects of the above refugee influx 
in Ngara District, where the huge 
Benaco camp is located: 
(i) The stocks of food were used up: 
either sold, given for free or stolen 
by the refugees [at crossing points] 
before the refugees could enter the 
relief supply system. 
(ii) Farms [of local people] were de- 
stroyed, either trampled by people 
or livestock. 
(iii) Water sources were affected either 
through ovelruse or human pollu- 
tion. 
(iv) There is great environmental deg- 
radation resulting from indiscrimi- 
nate cutting of trees [several 
hectares of forest have been wiped 
out for firewood and other uses]. 
(v) Some local villagers died from dis- 
eases brought by refugees. At 
Kasange 6 local people died of dys- 
entery together with 21 refugees. 
(vi) Some schools were destroyed by 
refugees who stayed in them. 
(vii) Women have been affected be- 
cause some of their used up crops 
were a source of their independent 
income to purchase clothing and 
other items. Men are refusing to 
take responsibility and hence the 
women are forced to work in farms 
in non-affected villages in return 
for food for the family. 
(viii) There is increasing theft and 
armed robbery. At Rusumo village 
3 people were recently wounded by 
bullets following an armed rob- 
bery. Apparently, the refugees who 
had sold everything can only steal 
now. At the same time, there is or- 
ganized crime operating from 
Benaco. 
To the above we could add: 
(ix) The slow destruction of roads 
caused by heavy convoy trucks 
carrying relief supplies. 
A close examination of the above 
problems shows that hardly any of 
them justifies long-term development 
assistance. Problems (i), (ii), (vi) and 
(vii) are about losses that can be easily 
quantified. An administrative machin- 
ery could be put in place to process 
compensation of those affected, debit- 
ing the claims against the relief budget 
made available for that particular 
emergency. Problem (ix), which is 
about rehabilitation of roads, can be 
negotiated with the World Food Pro- 
gramme (WFP) which uses those 
trucks. WFP could then make a budg- 
etary allocation for that purpose as it 
has occasionally done with respect to 
infrastructural rehabilitation else- 
where (e.g. Bujumbura Port). Such 
assistance to repair existing infrastruc- 
ture is not "long-term" development 
assistance. 
Problems (iii) and (v) are one-time 
events of an emergency nature, which 
require emergency health and sanita- 
tion measures that can be funded from 
short-term relief budgets. Regarding 
environmental degradation (Problem 
iv), it is not administratively impossi- 
ble to introduce a tree planting scheme 
in the refugee camp, making the refu- 
gees replace the trees they cut for 
firewood and other purposes. This is 
not improper because just as refugees 
have rights, they also have obligations. 
Finally, the security problem LX- 
pressed in (viii) does not require any 
international assistance at all. Tanza- 
nia has quite a sizable army and a Field 
Force Unit. During peace time, these 
forces are available and more than ad- 
equate to police a refugee camp, large 
as the latter may be. Securing the na- 
tional territory and its citizens is a duty 
that the state must be able to perform, 
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the management of its own chosen 
agents, at the very least in a joint ad- 
ministration with the host state. 
NGOs, local authorities and targeted 
communities also vie for control of the 
projects. 
Answering who the appropriate 
operational agent should be is not 
easy. Donor states may have suspect 
motives for sending their own people 
to the projects. Most host countries 
have a poor record of development 
management. Such record does not 
justlfy those states' self-imposition on 
new development initiatives when 
they are already presiding over many 
moribund projects. NGOs, recently 
rediscovered as the missing link in the 
development mission, have their prob- 
lems too: narrow mandates that fall 
short of the vision of an "integrated" 
approach to development; dubious 
images and goals for some; the profes- 
sional quality of their staffers, etc. The 
remaining credible actors are the local 
communities themselves, which un- 
fortunately nobody seems ready to 
empower. 
What the foregoing seems to sug- 
gest is that even RAD is at the mercy of 
polity primacy. 
Repatriation and Development: 
What Kind of Development? 
The RAD,approach has also been pre- 
scribed for repatriation. According to 
Gorman (1993,154): 
[tlhe principles that apply to refugee 
aid in developing countries equally 
apply in the case where the country 
of origin receives repatriated refu- 
gees back from asylum. Among these 
principles is the notion that assist- 
ance should be targeted to rehabilita- 
tion of regions to which refugees and 
displaced persons return, rather than 
providing assistance solely to repat- 
riating refugees or internally dis- 
placed populations as separate and 
distinct groups. 
As Gorman explains, the argument 
in support of returnee aid and devel- 
opment is the same as RAD's: 
Returnees can place just as signifi- 
cant a burden on the economic and 
social infrastructures of their coun- 
tries of origin when they return, as 
they do on their countries of asylum, 
when they initially flee. Massive 
poverty and overburdened infra- 
structures are impediments to suc- 
cessful repatriation and integration 
of returnees, just as they are to the 
provision of assistance in refugee af- 
fected regions of asylum countries. 
Moreover, for the local populations 
that continue to occupy refugee or 
returnee affected areas, any large or 
sudden influx of people, whether 
strangers from across the border or 
the familiar faces of returning kins- 
folkor former neighbours, canbe dis- 
ruptive. (ibid., 5-6) 
As a twin to RAD, returnee aid and 
development is destined to experience 
the same implementational problems 
with regard to the question of appro- 
priate operational agencies of develop- 
ment projects and the kind of 
development envisaged in the areas 
where returnees settle. In connection 
with the appropriate development 
strategy, UNRISD (1993,25) has sug- 
gested an approach that achieves a 
better balance between humanitarian 
and development assistance: 
It is important to achieve a better 
balance between short-term humani- 
tarian assistance and development 
aid by channelling more resources 
toward small-scale community- 
based projects and quick impact as- 
sistance designed to rehabilitate 
agricultural production and essen- 
tial social services. Long term devel- 
opment assistance should focus less 
on large-scale capital intensive 
project and more on human resource 
development, capacity building 
within the public administration, in- 
frastructural repair and safety nets 
for vulnerable groups. 
Like FWD, returnee aid and devel- 
opment thinking recognizes that re- 
turnees are not necessarily a burden to 
the areas they return to. It recognizes 
that they may actually be an asset for 
development, hence the need to reinte- 
grate them "within the authority struc- 
ture at local government and 
cooperative levels" (Koehn 1994,104). 
Following the realization that devel- 
opment projects have long suffered 
from lack of active participation of lo- 
cal communities and their respective 
insjitutions, repatriation-related de- 
velbpment assistance has lately placed 
great emphasis on community-centred 
development strategies, marginaliz- 
ing the developmental role of the state. 
Such strategies are intended to counter 
the flaws inherent to national develop- 
ment approaches which, 
pursue large scale, macro strategies 
without considering the needs of or- 
dinary people and directing the ben- 
efits of development to the poor, 
produc[ing] a lopsided pattern of 
growth that fails to deal with the 
pressing human problems of under- 
development. (James Midgley, in 
Callamard, 1993 145). 
This is the "Basic Needs Approach" 
defined as the satisfaction of 
the minimum requirements essential 
for decent existence, including items 
of private consumption (food, shel- 
ter and clothing) as well as certain 
socially-provided services (safe 
drinking water, sanitation, public 
transport, health and educational fa- 
cilities. (Callamard 1993, 136-7) 
Empowerment of community 
grassroots for development has been 
attempted in several areas. In Tigray, 
the "baito" (local council) system was 
conceived and employed "from grass- 
roots up . . . [as] part of a two-pronged 
strategy aimed at self-empowered sur- 
vival" (Hailu et al. 1994, 37). In 1985, 
the Eritrean Relief Association devel- 
oped a one-year agricultural rehabili- 
tation program by empowering the 
communities to increase food produc- 
tion through distribution of seeds, 
tools and oxen, fertilihers, pesticides, 
and workshops for production, main- 
tenance and repair of tools (Sorenson 
1994,79). 
In Central America, a Special Pro- 
gram for Displaced Persons, Refugees 
and Returnees (PRODERE) has "insti- 
tuted a planning network that permits 
the participation of local groups, such 
as mayors' offices, community repre- 
sentatives, NGOs, cultural organiza- 
tions, and professional associations . . . . 
Community members are also in- 
volved in the execution of projects" 
(Mihalkanin 1993, 99). The effective- 
ness of the program is supposed to be 
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enhanced by visible results of Quick 
Impact Projects (QIPs). These projects 
have the aim of: 
anchoring repatriation, as a durable 
solution by maximizing returnees' 
chances of significant reintegration 
into their communities . . . [They are 
expected to bring about] the ecoc 
nomic and social reactivation of com- 
munities, towns or even entire 
regions serving as the basis on which 
national development plans can be 
built . . . in most repatriation opera- 
tions, returning refugees are pra- 
vided with a basic package of 
rehabilitation assistance including 
foodstuffs (usually for a three to six 
month period), shelter materials, 
seeds, other agricultural inputs and 
cash grants (approximately $50 per 
person). ( UNHCR 1992,2-4). 
PRODERE is a multisectoral program 
involving road construction and 
improvement, rehabilitation and con- 
struction of schools, rehabilitation of 
health clinics, provision of credit for 
local production projects, housing 
schemes, humanitarian legislation, 
and job creation (Mihalkanin 1993,99- 
106). 
Despite such innovations in the area 
of returnee aid and development, 
achievements toward sustainable de- 
velopment remain very minimal. 
UNRISD (1993,13) has made the sdme 
observation: 
It has become almost a clich6 to assert 
that relief work needs to be turned 
into sustainable development initia- 
tives. The issue has been debated far 
years, but almost nothing has been 
done. 
The problems of realizing post-repa- 
triation sustainable development are, 
once again, closely connected to the 
nature of the state and polity primacy. 
Since returnee aid and development in 
developing countries is almost entirely 
provided by rich donor countries, it is 
prone to the vagaries of the political 
interests of such donors. UNRISD 
(1993,18-20) has aptly articulated this 
problem: 
The political problem is that long- 
term development programmes are 
not only more expensive than hu- 
manitarian assistance, but funding 
for them is even more dependent on 
the perceived political self-interest of 
donors . . . The UNHCR and other 
United Nations agencies are re- 
quired to adopt a non-political stance 
in their relations with states and yet 
their funding is so organized (annual 
discretionary grants, earmarking of 
funds, etc.) that they can be used as 
instruments for advancing the na- 
tional interests of the major donor 
countries. 
This picture becomes even more bleak 
when one considers the assistance con- 
ditionalities of the Bretton Woods in- 
stitutions which have become the 
watchdogs of the interests of the donor 
countries. This will be illustrated by 
the case of Rwanda, which has recently 
sought assistance from the major do- 
nors in order to meet, among other 
things, program needs to resettle an 
estimated 3 million returning refugees 
and internally displaced persons. 
At a Geneva Round Table Confer- 
ence of January 18-19,1995, a US $764 
million budget was presented to vari- 
ous potential donors for Rwanda's 
in the productive sectors; and a liberal 
trade and exchange rate regime" 
(World Bank Representative, January 
1995). 
These principles, in depressed third 
world economies like Rwanda's, have 
terrible consequences on peasant sub- 
sistence economies, small scale manu- 
facturing, and even petty trade, which 
sustain the very livelihoods of third 
world populations. Taking Rwandan 
peasants as an example, an unregu- 
lated liberal trade regime means re- 
moving restrictions on the importation 
of food commodities. This is a sure way 
of killing per capita food production 
for nutritional and cash needs, thus 
undermining the basis for develop- 
ment in a predominantly rural subsist- 
ence economy. Such an approach 
dictated from above does not help "re- 
patriation and development." 
But even if the development ap- 
proach were right, for example, target- 
ing support to strengthen the survival 
strategies of returnees and the stayees 
alike, the politics on the ground would 
The problems of realizing post-repatriation sustainable 
development are, once again, closely connected to 
the nature of the state and polity primacy. 
medium-term reconstruction (US $264 
million to support the resettlement of 
refugees and internally displaced per- 
sons, and US $500 million to support 
the socioeconomic rehabilitation ef- 
fort). Even assuming that this amount 
will be made available, the govern- 
ment will be bound to spend it in the 
context of the Bretton Woods institu- 
tions' structural adjustment program 
straitjacket, with all its well known 
adverse consequences on social and 
political stability. 
The conditions attached to the 
above recovery program take away the 
government's latitude to steer the 
economy in the direction of an inward- 
looking dynainic. The assistance pack- 
age prescribes, among other things, 
"the adoption of a comprehensive and 
still determine program success or fail- 
ure. Factors identified by Mihalkanin 
(1993) as hampering reconstruction 
programmes in Central America help 
to underscore the pivotal role of poli- 
tics and state. Some of those factors are: 
distrust between the government and 
NGOs; distrust among neighbouring 
countries; distrust between potential 
donor states and the government; dis- 
trust among political parties; distrust 
of the technical competency of the gov- 
ernments; and occurrence of human 
rights violations such as disappear- 
ances and extrajudicial executions. 
The above problems clearly stem 
from politics, whose dynamism is 
shaped by the deficient nature of the 
state. Yet ironically, it is the same state 
which is in a unique position to pro- 
transparent privatization policy; a pri- ' vide solutions to those problems. For 
vate sector freed of unnecessary r e p -  example, in the Central American case, 
lations to enable recovery and growth Mihalkanin (1993, 106) suggests the 
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following measures to improve QIP 
implementation: "legal protection; 
monitoring of uprooted population 
movements; ensuring safety and secu- 
rity; overseeing project implementa- 
tion, and developing democratic 
institutions." It is the view presented 
here that no actor, other than the state, 
is equipped to implement these meas- 
ures. 
The particular problems of RAD 
and those of "repatriation and devel- 
opment" are part of a larger "ensem- 
ble": it is the general development 
problematique, at the heart of which 
lies the crucial question of what kind of 
development is suitable for develop- 
ing countries. This riddle is still engag- 
ing the minds of development analysts 
and no consensual breakthrough 
seems to be in sight on the horizon. 
LLambias-Wolff (1995) has identified 
a new breed of development models 
which depart from the dominant 
"market forces" model. These models 
are summarized as: "grassroots com- 
munity development; a Green Alterna- 
tive; community-oriented economics; 
radical socialist strategies; the Lisbon 
Group; ecofeminism; and the funda- 
mental human need approach" (ibid., 
14-15). What these approaches seem to 
have in common is a community-cen- 
tred view of development, which in 
many ways implies loosening the 
state's grip on community control. If 
this is the case, realization of such de- 
velopment alternatives will require 
fundamental reforms in the state itself. 
Where the state does not represent a 
social contract, this should happen so 
that community-centred development 
finds support in an enabling and re- 
sponsive macro-economic environ- 
ment which only the state can create. 
This is important because outside a 
sound macro-economic context, 
. . . parochial community-based strat- 
egies which assume that massive 
problems facing the developing 
counties can be solved through local 
efforts alone, are unlikely to bring 
about real social and economic im- 
provements. (James Midgley, in 
Callamard 1993,145) 
Conclusion 
On the basis of the literature surveyed, 
there is no proof that there exists a 
causal link between refugee genera- 
tion, durable solutions and develop- 
ment, respectively. In the absence of 
evidence, placing "development" at 
the centre stage of refugee studies may 
detract research efforts from the actual 
centre of gravity of the whole refugee 
problematique. It is proposed here that 
an appropriate centre is the state, and 
that the refugee question is a function 
and product of state behaviour, as is 
development itself. To that extent, a 
product (the refugee phenomenon) 
cannot be more causally related to an- 
other product (development) than it is 
to the producer of both (the state). The 
preference for a polity primacy ap- 
proach to the study of the refugee ques- 
tion is informed by that logic. 
It is therefore suggested that refu- 
gee studies would do well to redirect 
some of its research capability to the 
pathological condition of the state and 
the means that would make the latter 
amenable to rehabilitation. Whereas 
the pathological condition of the state 
may be more obvious in developing 
countries, it also afflicts certain rich 
industrial states whose excessive self- 
interest often contributes to refugee- 
generation and undermines the 
success of durable solutions. 
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